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Jnterparty Competition and Redisbihution: 
Theme and Variation (> 
BRIAN R. FRY 
Universi,ty af South Carolina 
Probably the most thoroughly scrutinized linkage in the literature 
on public policies in the American states is the relationship between 
interparty competition and policy outcomes. The results of the various 
analyses have been largely negative. Regardless of the policy arena 
employed , interparty competition has failed to reveal the expected re-
lationships with public policies. No convincing associations have been 
demonstrated between interparty competition and such outputs as levels 
of aggregate state revenues and expenditures, levels of functional cate-
gories of state revenues and expenditures, financial centralization, pro-
gressive taxation, governmental expansion, policy innovation, and the 
oongruence between public opinion and public policies in the American 
states.1 It is possible, of course, to challenge the validity of the measures 
of interparty competition and public policies employed in these analyses 
or the statistical tests of the relationships. 2 However, the consistently 
negative findings over a relatively broad range of policy outputs sug-
gests that a reconceptualization of the relationship between interparty 
competition and public policy is in order-indeed overdue. 
In this study, we propose to re-examine the influence of interparty 
competition on public policy in the American states in an area in which 
such an influence is most commonly predicted-namely, the redistribu-
tive configuration of state revenues and expenditures. Further, we shall 
• I wish to thank Professors Heinz Eulau, Hubert Marshall, and William Paisley 
for their comments on an earlier draft of this paper. I also wish to express my 
gratitude to the Hoover Institution on War , Revolution, and Peace for its financial 
support of this project. 
1 Thomas R. Dye, Politics, Economics, and the Public: Policy Outcomes in the 
American States (Chicago: Rand McNallr,, 1966); John G. Gramm, "Structural De-
terminants of Legislative Policy Outputs, ' paper delivered at Conference on Meas-
urement of Public Policies in the American States, Ann Arbor, July 28 to August 3, 
1968; Jack L. Walker , "The Diffusion of Innovations Among the American States," 
American Political Science Review, LXIII, 3 ( September, 1969), 880-99; Frank 
Munger, "Opinions, Elections, Parties, and Policies: A Cross-State Analysis," paper 
delivered at the Sixty-fifth Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Asso-
ciation, New York, September 2 to 6, 1969. 
2 See John H. Fenton and Donald Chamberlayne, "The Literature Dealing with 
the Relationship Between Political Processes, Socio-Economic Conditions, and Public 
Policies in the American States: A Bibliographical Essay," Polity, I, 3 ( Spring, 1969 ), 
388-404 for a more positive interpretation of the research findings. 
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propose an alternative conceptualization of that relationship as well as 
an alternative view of the nature of party influence on public policies. 
CONCEPTUALIZATIONS OF THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN 
PARTY CHARACTERISTICS AND REDISTRIBUTION 
Much of the research involving the linkage between interparty com-
petition and public policy has been based upon the hypotheses devel-
oped by V. 0. Key in his analysis of Southern politics. 8 Key reasoned 
that the loose, factional politics he observed in several Southern states 
did not operate, as some had assumed, as functional equivalents of poli-
tical parties. The difference is that factions present neither continuing 
organizations nor identifiable groups of like-minded politicians to be held 
accountable for governmental actions or lack thereof. On the other hand, 
political parties possess both attributes. The consequences of a con-
tinuing organization and identifiable groups of politicians are that issues 
become a more prominent feature in the electoral process and parties 
must extend their appeal to a broader range of the electorate. In Key's 
words: "When two distinct groups with some identity and continuity 
exist, they must raise issues and appeal to the masses if for no other 
reason than the desire for office."~ Key's reasoning is that electoral 
competition in a system marked by factional politics is likely to be based 
on idiosyncratic or personality factors rather than issues since the elec-
torate doesn't know whom to hold responsible for what. Party politics 
produces a clearer recognition of the "ins" and the "outs ," and the elec-
torate is better able to determine which rascals to throw out. Finally, 
Key suggests that competing partisan organizations will work to the ad-
vantage of the ''have-not" elements of society, specifically in the form 
of state fiscal policy: 
. . . Politics generally comes down, over the long run, to a conflict 
between those who have and those who have less. In state politics 
the crucial issues tend to turn around taxation and expenditure. 
What level of public education and what levels of other public serv-
ices shall be maintained? How shall the burden for their support 
be distributed? ... 
It follows that the grand objective of the haves is obstruction, at 
least of the haves who take only a short-term view. Organization 
is not always necessary to obstruct; it is essential, however, for the 
promotion of a sustained program in behalf of the have-nots, 
although not all party or factional organization is dedicated to that 
8 V. 0. Key, Jr., Southern Politics (New York: Vintage Books, 1949), Ch. 14. 
4 Ibid. , p. 304. 
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purpose. It follows, if these propositions are correct, that over the 
long run the have-nots lose in disorganized politics.~ 
In sum, Key argues that interparty competition leads to an extension 
of effective suffrage, which leads to issue delineation, both of which 
result in a better break for the relatively disadvantaged portion of the 
population. It should be pointed out that Key's observations were lim-
ited to the South and he was discussing gross differences between one-
party and two-party systems. The empirical tests, on the other hand, 
have dealt with a broader range of states and are concerned with de-
grees of interparty competition rather than the presence or absence of 
such competition. The extension of Key's reasoning to the broader case 
is problematical and may account for the difficulties in achieving his 
hypothesized results. 
Another view of interpar:ty competition with decidedly different 
policy implications has been presented by Anthony Downs. 6 Downs 
bases his analysis on the presumption that voters are able to place poli-
tical parties on a continuum ranging from extreme conservatism to ex-
treme liberalism. Voters are arranged along a similar continuum. Voters 
will choose that party closest to their own position along the liberal-
conservative continuum. Voters evaluate the position of a party on the 
basis of policy stances which that party takes, their party affiliation be-
ing determined by the voters' overall evaluation of party stands on 
various issues. 
The nature of party competition, according to Downs, will be de-
termined by the shape of the distribution of the electorate along the 
liberal-conservative continuum. If this distribution is bimodal or multi-
modal, there are likely to be two or more political parties with fairly 
well-defined stands corresponding, roughly, to the several modes of pub-
lic attitudes. If, however, the distribution is unimodal, both parties will 
try to locate themselves as close as possible to this single modal position. 
The parties move to the center in order to appeal to more voters and do 
so with the assurance that they will not lose many supporters at the 
tails of the continuum since even these voters are likely to choose the 
lesser of two evils. 7 
In other words, while Key was arguing that interparty competition 
is likely to produce appeals to the tails of the yoter distribution as par-
0 Ibid., p. 307. 
6 Anthony Downs, An Eccmcmic Theory of Democracy (New York: Harper and 
Row, 1957), Ch. 8. 
7 Downs does say that if the extreme voters seek to affect electoral outcomes 
in the ~ture or if they cannot distinguish between the two parties, they may defect 
or abstam. 
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ties seek support from previously unrepresented sectors, Downs reasons 
that competing parties will gravitate toward the middle of the con-
tinuum where the bulk of the votes resides. New voters may alter the 
location of the apex of the continuum, but, unless they enter in large 
numbers, the unimodal character of the distribution is not likely to be 
altered. 
The consequence of party movement to the center is that parties 
become more alike in their stands on policy. Thus party competition, 
assuming a unimodal distribution of the population, leads to issue ob-
fuscation rather than, as Key hypothesized, issue delineation. Further, 
Downs asserts that a unimodal distribution of public opinion is likely 
in a stable democracy since a radical departure from that configuration 
will lead to conflict, violence, and instability. 
Now, if we assume that interparty competition actually blurs issues 
rather than clarifying them, it follows from Key's line of reasoning that 
the resulting confusion among the voters will make it difficult for them 
to choose rationally between parties on the basis of their own self-in-
terest and thus interparty competition will not have the redistributive 
impact which Key foresaw. The crucial link in Key's chain of reasoning 
is that interparty competition will produce issue-based politics calcu-
lated to give the party broader appeal. In the Downs model, parties 
are similarly motivated ( i.e., they seek to gain broad support); however, 
the means for achieving this end are to adopt policy stands closer to the 
mode and, since the opposing party is behaving in the same manner, 
closer to the stands of the opposing party. 8 
Thus we can find some theoretical foundation for predicting sub-
stantially different policy consequences in terms of redistribution as the 
result of interparty competition. 9 Key predicts redistribution in the 
favor of lower income groups as a system moves from one-party factional 
politics to two-party, issue-oriented politics. An extension of Downsian 
logic suggests less redistribution due to the policy confusion emanating 
from a situation in which two par-ties are competing for the same space 
on the political continuum. 
As a final variation on a theme, we can entertain the almost hereti-
cal notion that party dominance rather than interparty competition is 
related to the redistributive configuration of state revenues and expendi-
8 See Donald Stokes, "Spatial Models of Party Competition," American Political 
Science Review, LVII, 2 (June, 1963), 368-77, for an incisive critique of Downs' 
general theory. 
9 Much the same distinction between Key and Downs has been drawn by 
Cnudde. See Charles F. Cnudde, "Public Opinion and State Politics," in Robert Crew 
(ed.), State Politics (Belmont, Calif.: Wadsworth Publishing Co., Inc., 1968), pp. 
165-84. 
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ures.10 This notion is based on the common-sense proposition that it is 
not the mechanics of interparty competition but the programmatic pre-
dilections of the party in power which determine the nature of state 
:fiscal programs. Accordingly, we can assume that dominance by the 
Democratic party will be associated with redistribution in favor of the 
lower income classes due to the public stance of that party in favor of 
such programs-at least relative to the public stance of the Republican 
party. This conception of party stands is, of course, a gross over-sim-
plification of a complex situation given the overlapping nature of the 
ideological continuum in the two major parties. However, it provides 
us with a rudimentary device for the examination of a plausible alter-
native to the interparty competition thesis. 
MEASURES OF REDISTRIBUTION 
The measures of redistribution employed in this study represent a 
revised and extended version of an index of redistribution developed in 
an earlier analysis.11 Briefly, that index was based on an allocation of 
revenue burdens and expenditure benefits to nine income classes in each 
state derived from a study by the Tax Foundation. 12 The analysis yields 
a ratio of expenditure benefits to revenue burdens for each income class 
in each state. These ratios provide the basis for the present analysis, but 
there are three significant changes from the previous analysis. First, 
we shall employ four summary measures of redistribution rather than 
the single measure employed in the previous analysis. Second, inter-
governmental revenues and expenditures have been excluded from this 
analysis in an effort to isolate that portion of state revenues and expendi-
tures most susceptible to statewide political influences. Third, the 
eleven states of the Confederacy are e,ccluded from analysis to avoid 
ambiguity in the interpretation of the party variables. 
The four summary measures of redistribution are: the summed 
benefit-burden ratio for the three lowest income classes ( less than 
$4,000) in each state , the summed benefit-burden ratio for the middle 
10 Measures of party dominance , somewhat surprisingly, have received consid-
erably less attention than measures of interparty competition. And, where they have 
been employed, they have achieved only indifferent empirical success. Dye and 
Fredlund, Hymans , and Morss found little independent relationship between meas-
ures of party dominance and measures of public policy. Alt, in his study of English 
and Welsh county boroughs, however, discovered some differences based upon party 
control. See Dye, op. cit., pp. 239-46; Eric J. Fredlrmd, Saul Hymans, and Elliott 
Morss, "Fluctuations in State Expenditures: An Econometric Analysis," Southern 
Ecorurmic Journal, XXXIII, 2 (April, 1967), 496-517; and J. Alt, "Some Social and 
Political Correlates of County Borough Expenditures," British Journal of Political 
Science, I, 1 (January, 1971 ), 49-62. 
11 Brian R. Fry and Richard F. Winters, "The Politics of Redistribution," Amer-
ican Political Science Review, LXN, 2 (June, 1970) 508-22. 
12 Tax Foundation, Inc., Tax Burdens and B~ts uf Government Expenditures 
by Income Class, 1961 and 1965 (New York: Tax Foundation, Inc., 1967). 
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four income classes ( $4,000-$9,999) in each state , the summed benefit-
burden ratio for the two highest income classes ( $10,000 and over) in 
each state , and the slope of the benefit-burden ratio for each income 
class regressed on a numeric al designation of the income class ( See 
Table I). 
TABLE I. Dependent V ariahles by State (1961) 
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~l:Q State 
..,r..~ .., 0 tr.. 0 
l:Q l:Q l:Q A:: 
Arizona . ..... . . .. .. . .. . .. . ... 1.546 0.678 0.748 -.188 
California ....... . .. . . . ....... 1.548 0.687 0.643 -.186 
Colorado .. . . . ... . ..... . ...... 1.266 0.683 0.677 -.137 
Connecticut .. .. ......... .. ... 2.503 0.969 0.798 -.367 
Delaware . . .. . ...... . . . .. . ... 2.034 0.924 0.621 -.301 
Idaho . . ..... . .. . ...... 2.286 0.908 0.794 -.365 
Illinois .... . . . . . . ... ..... . . ... 2.126 0.775 0.778 - .310 
Indiana . . ' . . . . .... . .... . . . ... 1.393 0.827 1.049 -.092 
Iowa . . ............. 2.020 0.898 0.931 -.287 
Kansas . . . ........... .. . . .... 1.332 0.886 0.964 -.092 
Kentucky . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.515 0.946 0.808 -.397 
Maine ..... .. ..... . .... 2.184 0.940 0.937 - .301 
Maryland . .......... . . . ...... 1.324 0.624 0.572 -.156 
Massachusetts .... . .... . .... . , . 2.253 0.848 0.528 - .355 
Michigan ........ .. .......... 1.555 0.728 0.808 -.176 
Minnesota ... . . . .. . .. . . .. . .. 1.357 0.750 0.700 - .144 
Missouri . . ... . ............ ... 3.081 0.881 0.769 -.548 
Montana ... .. . . ....... . . . . 2.185 1.039 0.999 -.281 
Nebraska . . . '.' . . ..... . . . ... ' 1.447 1.076 1.363 -.041 
Nevada . . .. ' . . ' . .. . . - .. - ..... 1.772 0.772 0.858 -.202 
New Hampshire .............. 2.101 1.146 1.144 -.242 
New Jersey ............ . ..... 1.838 0.697 0.587 -.261 
New Mexico .............. . .. 1.646 0.716 0.860 -.197 
New York ........ . . . ...... 1.800 0.659 0.429 -.277 
North Dakota ........ . . .. .... 1.969 1.001 1.132 -.209 
Ohio . . .. . ... . ...... . . 1.952 0.733 0.719 -.271 
Oklahoma . . . . . . .............. 2.791 0.714 0.725 -.520 
Oregon ... . . . . . . . . . . 2.503 0.847 0.718 -.427 
Pennsylvania ................. 1.938 0.708 0.578 -.299 
Rhode Island ... . ... .. ........ 2.458 0.832 0.699 -.389 
South Dakota . . ............. 2.125 1.241 1.441 -.198 
Utah .... . .... . .............. 1.941 0.934 1.009 -.240 
Vermont .... . ......... . ... 2.581 1.242 1.126 -.363 
Washington . ............. . ... 1.861 0.679 0.729 -.261 
West Virginia ... - . .. .. . . .. ... 2.064 0.824 0.908 -.279 
Wisconsin . .. . .. . .... . ........ 1.398 0.610 0.494 -.197 
Wyoming .. .. ............... 1.567 1.166 1.345 -.061 
Mean . . . . . . . .... .. ....... 1.953 0.854 0.837 -.260 
Range ..... . .......... . .. 1.815 0.632 1.012 .507 
Standard Deviation . ... . . . . 0.449 0.170 0.242 .116 
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The first summary measure of redistribution, the summed benefit-
burden ratio for the three lowest income classes, reflects net benefits 
accruing to the lowest income classes in each state as the result of the 
fiscal policies adopted by the state. 
The second and third summary measures of redistribution, the 
summed benefit-burden ratio for the middle four income classes and the 
two highest income classes reflect net benefits of state fiscal policies for 
those groups. The addition of these variables permits us to examine the 
possibility that there are different determinants of state redistributive 
efforts in various income groupings. For instance, the benefit-burden 
ratio for the middle income classes can be employed to investigate the 
hypothesis that measures of party chariacteristics have an influence on 
the benefit-burden ratio of the middle income groups while failing to 
have such an effect on the ratio for the lowest income groups. 
The fourth measure employed, the slope of the benefit-burden ratio 
regressed on a numerical representation of income class, is also an indi-
cator of redistribution in favor of the lower income classes. This vari-
able was constructed by assigning numbers 1 through 9 in ascending 
order to each of the nine income classes for each state. Regression analy-
ses were run between the assigned numbers and the benefit-burden ratio 
for each income class in each state. The slope of the regression line 
measures changes in the benefit-burden ratio as one progresses up the 
income scale. A negative slope means that the benefit-burden ratio de-
creases as income increases. To the extent that the descent is monotonic 
and linear, the regression slope accurately measures directional redis-
tribution in favor if the lower income classes. If the descent departs 
from linearity or monotonicity, the measure will be less accurate, which 
should be reflected in a reduced proportion of variance accounted for 
by the numerically designated income classes. 
The correlation between income class designation and the benefit-
burden ratio ranges from .38 in Nebraska to .87 in New York, which 
means that income class designation accounts for between 14% and 75% 
of the variances in the riatios in each non-Southern state. Income class 
designation accounts for at least 50% of the variation in 31 of the 37 
non-Southern states with the median amount of variance accounted for 
standing at 58%. In six states 70% or more of the variance in benefit-
burden ratios is accounted for. These statistics indicate that there is a 
relatively good fit between income class designation and the benefit-
burden ratios, which, in tum, means that the regression slope variable 
can be interpreted in most states with confidence that it actually reflects 
redistribution in favor of the lower income classes. The measure is also 
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consistent in that the slope is negative for all states, indicating that the 
ratios generally decrease as income increases. 
The regression slope has two advantages over the summed ratio for 
the three lowest income groups as a measure of redistribution in favor 
of the lower income classes. First, this measure is not dependent on an 
arbitrary selection of income classes to be examined. The regression 
slope measures directional redistribution throughout the income range. 
Second, the summed ratio for the three lowest income classes may be 
higher than the ratio for any other income grouping in a particular state, 
but the degree of advantage may vary considerably among the states. 
The regression slope indicates the relative degree of advantage while 
the summed ratio for the three lowest income classes may reflect only 
absolute advantage. It is probably best to interpret the summed ratio 
for the three lowest income classes as a measure of the treatm ent of 
the lowest income classes among the states while the regression slope 
is a more accurate measure of the relative treatment of the lower in-
come classes within each state. 
The inter-correlations among the four dependent variables are rela-
tively low. Only two of the seven rela-tionships exceed .50. The two 
cases of high inter-correlation are the relationship between the benefit-
burden ratio for the three lowest income classes and the regression slope 
and the relationship between the benefit-burden ratios for the middle 
and upper income classes. All these variables have been retained in the 
subsequent analysis in spite of these high inter-correlations beca use the 
interaction of these variables with other variables in the analysis differs 
in a theoretically significant manner. 
CAVEATS 
Several limitations in the construction of the dependent variables 
should be kept in mind in interpreting the results of this analysis. First, 
the Tax Foundation study upon which our measures of redistrib ution 
are built, focused on the aggregate redistributive consequences of state 
revenues and expenditures rather than state-by-state estimates. The 
method used mutes variations in redistributive impac t among the states 
due to such factors as differential spending habits, size of the income 
classes, and structural differences in revenue and expenditure pro-
grams.18 Second, the shifting and incidence assumptions for both reve-
13 See Bernard H. Booms and James R. Halldorson, "The Politics of Redistribu-
tion: A Reformation," American Political Science Review, LXVII, 3 ( September, 
1973) (forthcoming), for a revised version of the benefit-burden ratio for the three 
lowest income classes which adjusts for income class size. We have not used the 
suggested revision because adjusting for income in the dependent variable definition-
ally inflates the relationships between income and income-related variables and the 
dependent variable. 
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nue and expenditure categories can be challenged. Third, the exclusion 
of intergovernmental revenues and expenditures has a differential effect 
in the various states which tends to be associated with the size of the 
benefit-burden ratios. In states where intergovernmental revenues ex-
ceed intergovernmental expenditures, the benefit-burden ratios will be 
higher ceteris paribus, than in states where intergovernmental expendi-
tures ~xceed intergovernmental revenues. Thus, the dependent variable 
contains a component which is only tangentially related to the item of 
concern in this analysis-Le., differences in redistributive patterns pro-
duced by the relative dependence of each state on various revenue 
sources and expenditure programs. 
In short, we make no pretense that the measures of redistribution 
employed in this analysis are definitive. Rather, we consider them a 
legitimate point of departure for the analysis of an important dimension 
of state policies. 
MEASURES OF PARTY CHARACTERISTICS 
A multitude of measures of interparty competition have been con-
structed relating to a variety of offices and time periods. Our strategy, 
while selective, was to use several measures of interparty competition 
in an effort to avoid potentially artif actural results. 
In selecting the variables to be used in this analysis, we first ex-
cluded measures not dealing with statewide offices. This criterion ex-
cludes mist measures dealing with national contests and some measures 
which deal only with state legislatures. Next, we grouped the measures 
of interparty competition according to the dimension of pa11ty compe-
tition with which they were concerned. Two general categories were 
used in this process-the closeness of the election and the actual sharing 
of office. 
The first category includes indices of minority paJ.1ty support ex-
pressed as a percentage of the total vote received by the minori-ty party 
and/ or the percentage of the seats in a sta,te legislature held by the 
minority party. The specific measures in this category are: Ranney's 
index of the percentage of the vote received by the minority party candi-
date for governor and the percentage of the seats held by the minority 
party in the state legislature for the period 1938 to 1958; 14 Hofferbert's 
measure of the percentage of the vote received by the minority party 
u Austin Ranney, "Parties in State Politics," in Herbert Jacob and Kenneth N. 
Vines (eds.), Politics in the American States: A Comparative Analysis (Boston: Lit-
tle, Brown, & Co., 1965), pp. 61-99. 
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candidate for governor for the period 1932 to 1962; 16 Pfeiffer's measure 
of the percentage of the vote received by minority party candidates for 
statewide offices and by all minority party candidates for the U. S. House 
of Representatives between 1940 and 1964; 16 and Fenton's index con-
sisting of the sum of the percentage of the vote received by the minority 
party candidate for governor and the percentage of the seats in the state 
legislature controlled by the minority party between 1946 and 1948.17 
The measures of shared control have somewhat more internal varia-
tion. The first measure which we call "minority party success" is based 
on Hofferbert's compilation of the percentage of the time the minority 
party in a state controlled the governorship between 1932 and 1962.18 
The second measure, also derived from the Hofferbert index, relates to 
a pattern of alternation in office and is based upon the percentage of 
gubernatorial elections in which the winning party was different from 
the incumbent party in each state for the period between 1932 and 
1962.19 The final measure of party sha1ing is divided party control. Here 
we use Key's index which measures the percentage of the time in which 
the governorship and one or both of the houses of the state legislature 
were in the control of opposing parties for the period between 1931 and 
1952.20 
To explore the programmatic dimension of party behavior, we can 
make some minor alterations in available indices of interparty competi-
tion to transform them into measures of party dominance. We shall use 
three such measures: the average support for the Democratic candidate 
for governor and the percentage of the seats of each house of the state 
legislature controlled by the Democratic party for the period between 
1938 and 1958 ( based on the Ranney index) ,21 the average support for 
Democratic candidates for all statewide offices and Democratic candi-
16 Richard I. Hofferbert, "Classification of American State Party Systems," Jour-
nal of Politics, XXVI, 3 (August, 1964), 550-67. There are missing values for all of 
the Hofferbert measures for Kansas, apparently as the result of an oversight in his 
classification scheme. Values are also missing for Fenton's measure of minority party 
support and Key's measure of divided party control for Nebraska and . Minnesota. 
These states were omitted in the measures because legislators in both states are 
elected on a nonpartisan basis. Ranney's index uses only gubernatorial elections in 
assigning scale values to these states. The other indices do not use measures of 
competition in the legislature. Missing values were deleted pair-wise. That is, if a 
value is missing for any state for a particular variable , the computation excludes that 
state. However, if other variables are available for the same state, that state will be 
included in all computations for which variables are available. 
1a David G. Pfeiffer, "The Measurement of Inter-Party Competition and Sys-
temic Stability ," American Political Science Review, LXI, 2 (June, 1967), 457-67. 
11 John H. Fenton , People and Parties in Politics ( Glenview, Ill.: Scott, Fores-
man, and Co., 1966), p. 34. 
1s Hofferbert, op. cit. 
10 Ibid. 
20 V. 0. Key, Jr. , American State Politics (New York: Knopf, 1956), p. 55. 
21 Ranney, op. cit. 
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dates for the U. S. House of Representatives for the years 1940 to 1964 
(based on the pfeiffer index), 22 and a classification by Schlesinger based 
on the number of elections for governor won by Democrats and the 
number of elections in which there was no party change for the period 
from 1870 to 1950.23 The various measures and their components are 
summarized in Table II. 
TABLE n. Summary of Measures of Party Characteristics 
Category Components 
JNTERPARTY COMPETITION: 
Closeness Measures 
Ranney-Minority 
Party Support 
Hofferbert-Minority 
Party Support 
Pfeiffer-Minority 
Party Support 
Fenton-Minority 
Party Support 
Sharing .Measures 
Hofferbert-Minority 
Party Success 
Hofferbert-Party 
Alternation 
Key-Divided Party 
Control 
PARTY DOMINANCE: 
Ranney-Support for 
Democratic Party 
Pfeiffer-Support for 
Democratic Party 
Schlesinger-Support 
for Democratic Party 
% vote for minority party candidate for 
governor and % of seats in both houses 
controlled by minority party 
% vote for minority party candidate for 
governor 
% vote for minority party candidates for 
statewide offices and % vote for minor-
ity party candidates for U. S. House of 
Representatives 
% vote for minority party candidate for 
governor and % of legislative seats held 
by minority party 
% of gubernatorial elections won by 
minority party 
% of gubernatorial elections in which 
winning party differed from incumbent 
party 
% of time period in which governorship 
and one or both of legislative houses 
controlled by different parties 
% vote for Democratic candidates for 
governor and % of state legislative seats 
held by Democrats 
% vote for Democratic candidates for 
statewide offices and U. S. House of 
Representatives 
% of elections won by Democratic can-
didates for governor and duration of 
Democratic party control 
Time Period 
1938-1958 
1932-1962 
1940-1964 
1946-1948 
1932-1962 
1932-1962 
1931-1952 
1938-1958 
1940-1964 
1870-1950 
We shall examine three hypotheses concerning the relationship be-
tween party variables and state redisrributive efforts. Using Key's 
analysis as a point of departure, the following hypotheses will be 
considered: 
22 Pfeiffer, op. cit. 
23 Joseph A. Schlesinger, "A Two-Dimensional Scheme for Classifying States 
According to Degree of Inter-Party Competition," American Political Science Review 
XLIX, 4 (December, 1955), 1122. ' 
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1. Party closeness measures will be positively associated with state 
redistributive efforts in favor of the lower income classes and 
negatively associated with the benefit-burden ratios for the mid-
dle and upper income classes. 
2. Party sharin g measures will be positivel y associated with state 
redistributive efforts in favor of the lower income classes and 
neg atively associated with the benefit-burden ratios for the mid-
dle and upper income classes. 
The above measures of party ohariacteristics are both ways of view-
ing interparty competition. Key was most concerned with the sharin g 
measures since the process of the "outs" replacing the "ins" results in 
rewards for different constituencies and a redistributive effect. This 
process is best measured by minority party success, alternation in office, 
and, to some extent, divided party control. The closeness measures are 
not exactly what Key had in mind, but they can be interpreted as meas-
ures of the degree of threat to the major party which may make it more 
responsive to the interests of a broader constituency. 
In regard to the party dominance measures , we suggest the follow-
ing hypothesis: 
3. Democratic party support will be positively associated with stat e 
redistributive efforts in favor of the lower income classes and 
negatively associated with the benefit~burden ratios for the mid-
dle and upper income classes. 
This hypothesis, obviously, represents the opposite side of the coin. It 
suggests that the programmatic inclinations of the party in power rather 
than the mechanical factor of competition will produce redistri butive 
fiscal policies in favor of the lower income classes. 
FINDINGS 
Table III presents ,the zero order correlations between interparty 
competition and party dominance and the four measures of redis-
tribution." 
From the standpoint of the interparty competition hypothese s, the 
relationships can best be described as confusing. All of the correla tions 
in this table are negative. These results are in accord with the hyp o-
H Some of the variables in this analysis have been transformed to achieve a 
more "normal" distribution and to avoid distortions in the reported correlations. The 
transformations involved do not force normal distributions because of possible non-
monotonicity in the transformation process. Relatively simple transformations ( e.g., 
X8 or XGo) were employed to bring the correlations within acceptable limits. 
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TABLE m Zero Order Correlations Between Party Closeness, Party Sharing, and 
PartY Domfuance Measures and Redistribution Variables 
J.nterparty Competition 
Closeness Measures 
Ranney-Minority Party Support -.20 -.21 -.3()a -.13 
Hofferbert-Minority Party Support 
-.11 -.24 -.04 (Trans.) -.10 
Pfeiffer-Minority Party Support -.2sa -.46b -.5lb -.11 
Fenton-Minority Party Support 
(Trans.) -.08 -.22 -.37 8 -.00 
Sharing Measures 
Hofferbert-Minority Party Success -.5()b -.28" -.20 -.431> 
Hofferbeit-Party Alternation -.14 -.20 -.22 -.10 
Key-Divided Party Control (Trans.) -.18 -.24 -.33a -.13 
Party Dominance 
Ranney-Support for Democratic 
Party (Trans.) .14 -.42b -.39b .28a 
Pfeiffer-Support for Democratic 
Party .14 -.50b -.48b .soa 
Schlesinger-Support for Democratic 
Party .17 -.28" -.23 .26 
a Indicates signillcant at .05 level 
b Indicates significant at .01 level 
theses regarding the middle and upper income classes, but directly 
opposed to the hypothesis that higher levels of interparty competition 
result in higher net benefits for the lower income classes. The magni-
tide of most of the relationships is moderate to weak. Only nine of the 
twenty-eight coefficients of correlation reach the .05 level of significance 
and six of those correlastions involve the benefit-burden ratios for the 
middle and upper income classes where the gap between revenues and 
expenditures produced by the exclusion of intergovernmental revenues 
and expenditures has a major influence on the size of the ratios. The 
negative relationships across the board and the relatively low magni-
tudes of those relationships suggest that no income class benefits con-
sistently from higher levels of interparty competition. 
On the other hand, the measures of Democratic party dominance 
describe the predicted patterns of relationship. Each measure of Demo-
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cratic party dominance is positively associated with both measures of 
redistribution in favor of the lower income classes and negatively asso-
ciated with the benefit-burden ratios for the middle and upper income 
classes. Once again , however , the relationships between party domi-
nance and the measures of redistribution in favor of the lower income 
classes are moderate to weak and should be interpreted with some cau-
tion. Only two of the six coefficients of correlation attain the .05 level 
of significance. While the correlations for the benefit-burden ratios for 
the middle and upper income groups are considerately higher ( five of 
the six are significant at the .05 level), the ambiguity produced by the 
exclusion of inter governmental revenues and expenditures renders the 
findings somewhat suspect. 
There is always the possibility, of course, that other variables are 
either obscuring the expected relationships or that other variables actu-
ally account for those observed relationships. It is not possible to con-
sider all the alternatives , but we can take a step in that dfrection by 
examining a few obvious possibilities which threaten the validity of our 
findings. One particulary pregnant possibility is that levels of socio-
economic development account for the observed relationships. Levels of 
socio-economic development are closely associated with levels of inter-
party competition and it is quite likely that this association alters the re-
lationship between interparty competition and state redistributive efforts. 
In addition, one would expect that levels of socio-economic development 
could significantly influence all of the correlations involving the benefit-
burden ratios since income is negatively correlated with levels of inter-
governmental revenues. Intergovernmental revenues ( as well as inter-
governmental expenditures) have been excluded from this analysis and 
that exclusion may produce negative relationships between income-re-
lated variables and the benefit-burden ratios. We shall institute further 
controls for income distribution, electoral participation, and liberal par-
tisanship to counter some additional potential threats to the validity of 
our initial findings. 
The control procedure employed is partial coefficients of correlation. 
This is not an ideal device , but one necessitated by the small number of 
cases (states) available for analysis. We shall not institute simultane-
ous controls given the difficulties of interpreting high order partials, but 
we shall examine the controls sequentially. The control variables are: 
a factor score 25 for level of socio-economic development comprised of 
median family income, industrialization, urbanization (percentage of 
25 The factor analytic procedure employed was a principal components analysis 
in which the diagonals are unaltered and factors are extracted without rotation. 
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the population living in standard metropolitan statistical areas as de-
fined by the Bureau of the Census) ,26 and the reciprocal of the Cini 
index of income inequality; 27 the percentage of a state's population 
participating in gubernatorial and senatorial elections in nonpresiden-
tial years between 1962 and 1960 ( electoral participation) ;28 the per-
centage of a state's population wi.th income of less than $4,000; the 
percentage of a state's population with incomes of $4,000 to $9,999; the 
percentage of a state's population with incomes of $10,000 or more; 29 
and the percentage of a state's population claiming an ideological iden-
tification who identify as "liberals " ( liberal partisanship). 30 
We can also simplify the analysis considerably by factoring the 
measures of interparty competition and Demociiatic party dominance 
since each set of variables proves to be internally consistent and both the 
patterns and the magnitudes of the relationships between each set of 
variables and redistribution have proven to be generally similar. Prin-
cipal components factor analysis yields factors which account for 63% 
of the variance among the interpa:rty competition vaiiables and 84% of 
the variance among the party dominance measures. 
The oon:elations between the interparty competition and the Demo-
cratic party dominance faotors and the redistribution measures on both 
a controlled and an uncontrolled basis are shown in T,able IV. The zero 
order correlations between the two factors correspond to both the pat-
terns and magnitudes of the correlations observed in the separate analy-
ses for each variable. The interparty competition factor has a negative 
relationship with all of the measmes of redistribution and only the cor-
relation between the interparty oompetition faotor and the benefit-
burden ratio for the highest income groups reaches the .05 level of 
significance. The party dominance factor, as hypothesized, is positively 
associated with both measures of redistribution in favor of the lower 
income classes and negatively associated with the benefit-burden ratios 
28 Income, industrialization, and urbanization figures are taken from U. S. D~ 
partment of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, U. S. Census of the Population, 1960 
(Washington, D. C.; U. S. Government Printing Office, 1964), pp. 1-288, 1-249. 
27 David Verway, "A Ranking of States by Inequality Using Census and Tax 
Data," Review of Economics and Statistics, XLVIII, 3 (September, 1966), p. 314. 
28 Lester W. Milbrath, "Politica l Participation in the States," in Herbert Jacob 
and Kenneth N. Vines, op. cit., p. 40. 
29 U. S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, Statistical Abstract 
of the United States, 1964 (Washington, D. C.: U. S. Government Printing Office, 
1964), p. 341. 
80 This measure was provided by Ronald E. Weber of Indiana University. It 
~as derived from estimates from small state samples by use of the procedure devised 
m the Simulmatics Project. For a detailed report of the procedures employed, see 
Ronald E. Weber, Anne H. Hopkins, Michael L. Mezey, and Frank J. Munger, "A 
Methodology for Estimating State Policy Preferences" ( unpublished paper). 
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TABLE IV. Zero-Order and Partial Correlations Between Interparty Competition 
and Party Dominance Factors and Redistribution Variables 
5 5 ! 
-~ 
..... ,
.g i ~ o(>) ti :g g :g g 
c::~§ c:: ~O) ~]~ <l)i:c; 
= ..... = ..... 0) 
=~ 5 :~ ~~ ' ~,s~~ 
"E·J ._l"I< .. "§<-9-1 ;s <-9- ~ ]8, 1~ i:x:il = i~§} 
..!. J! i }1:: }1t~ t~c r;;:. 
~ti i:x:i~J i:x:i~-St: i:x:i~'S C::i:ti 
Zero-Order Correlaticns 
Interparty Competition Factor -.28 -.27 -.s7a -.20 
Party Dominance Factor .16 -.44b -.40b .31• 
Control for Economic Development Factor 
Interparty Competition Factor -.20 .13 .04 -.24 
Party Dominance Factor .20 -.4$1> -.ssa .82• 
Control for Economic Development Factor 
and Electoral Turnout 
Interparty Competition Factor -.24 -.21 -.20 -.19 
Party Dominance Factor .22 -.s1a -.29 .29 
Control /or Economic Development Factor 
and% o State's Population with 
Incomes less than $4,000 
Interparty Competition Factor 
-.13 .02 -.05 -.15 
Party Dominance Factor .11 -.34a -.31• .21 
Control /or Economic Development Factor 
and% o State's Population with 
Incomes of $4,000--$9,999 
Interparty Competition Factor -.20 .06 -.02 -.22 
Party Dominance Factor .22 -.28 -.28 .soa 
Control /or Economic Development Factor 
and% o State's Population with 
Incomes of $10,000 or more 
Interparty Competition Factor -.14 .18 .06 -.19 
Party Dominance Factor .24 -.42b -.ssa .35-
Control for Economic Development Factor 
and Liberal Partisanship 
Interparty Competition Factor -.18 .12 -.01 -.21 
Party Dominance Factor .23 -.44b -.42b .34• 
a Indicates significant at .05 level. 
b Indicates significant at .01 level. 
for the middle and upper income classes. Three of the four correlations 
between the party dominance factor and the measures of redistribution 
are significant at the .05 level. 
Moreover, none of the controls instituted ,appreciably change the 
picture. All of the controlled relationships between the interpar,ty com-
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petition factor and the two measures of redistribution in favor of the 
lower income classes are negative in contrast to Key's contention that 
higher levels of interparty competition would accrue to the benefit of 
the lower income classes. None of the correlations reaches the .05 level 
of significance indicating that we cannot reject the null hypothesis that 
interparty competition is unrelated to the level of net benefits for the 
lower income classes. The pattern of ,the relationships between inter-
party competition and the benefit-burden ratios for the middle and upper 
income classes is mixed. Only five of the twelve relationships are 
negative ( the direction hypothesized), but none of the correlations is 
signillcant at the .05 level. These data all suggest that interparty com-
petition is unrelated to the redistribitive configuration of revenues and 
expenditures in the American states. 
The controlled relationships between party dominance and redis-
tribution are almost identical to the zero order relationships between 
those variables. All of the correlations between party dominance and 
the two measures of redistribution in favor of the lower income classes 
are positive , as hypothesized. However, only four of the twelve corre-
lations are significant at the .05 level and all of these involve the 
regression slope measure. Thus the evidence that Democratic party 
dominance is associated with some downward shift in net benefits 
resulting from state fiscal policies is stronger than the evidence that 
those benefits reach the lowest income classes. The controlled relation-
ships between Democratic party dominance and the benefit-burden 
ratios for the middle and upper income classes are all negative, as 
hypothesized, and nine of the twelve partia,I con-elations are significant 
at the .05 level. 
Our data, then, present fairly strong support for the contention 
that the programmatic dimension of party control is more closely related 
to the redistributive configuration of state revenues and expenditures 
than is the mechanical factor of interparty competition. We submit two 
qualifications to this geneml finding . First, Democratic party dominance 
apparently results in redistribution in favor of the lower income classes, 
but the evidence is not convincing that these benefits reach the lowest 
income classes. Second, there appears to be some asymmetry in the 
effect of Democratic party dominance. The evidence that Democratic 
party control works to the disadvantage of the middle and upper income 
classes is much stronger than the evidence that Democratic party control 
works to the advantage of the lower income classes. 
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CONCLUSION 
This study bas examined contrasting conceptualizations of inter-
party competition and contrasting images of the nature of party influence 
on the redistributive configuration of state revenues and expenditures. 
In regard to interparty competition, we have contrasted hypotheses 
drawn from the works of V. 0 . Key and Anthony Downs. The data 
indicate that, regardless of the measure of interparty competition em-
ployed or the statistical controls invoked, the empirical relationships 
between interparty competition and redistribution fail to support the 
Key hypothesis that interparty competition will lead to more redistribu-
tion in favor of the lower income classes. Without controls, no income 
class seems to benefit from interparty competition. Indeed, all income 
groups appear to be at a relative disadvantage in a competitive partisan 
environment. With controls, the pattern for the lower income groups is 
the same, but the pattern for the middle and upper income groups is 
mixed. To add to the confusion, the strength of the relationships is, for 
the most part, quite low. These results are in direct contrast to Key's 
proposition that interparty competition is associated with redistribution 
in favor of the have-nots or at least the extension of that thesis beyond 
the Southern states . Both the pattern of ,the relationships and the 
strength of those relationships are far more compatible with Downs' 
assertion that interparty competition will lead to issue obfuscation with 
the result that every income class finds it difficult to use the system to 
its own advantage. 
In regard to the contrasting images of the nature of party influence 
on state redistributive efforts, we have contrasted the hypothesized 
effects of interparty competition and the hypothesized effects of Dem-
ocratic party dominance. This effort should be considered little more 
than a tentative probe into the programmatic predilections of political 
parties, but the results are at least minimally encouraging. The pattern 
of the relationships between Democratic party dominance and redistri-
butive efforts is consistently in the direction predicted. Democratic 
party dominance works to the advantage of the lower income classes 
and to the disadvantage of the middle and upper income groups. How-
ever, the weakness of the relationships between Democratic party 
dominance and redistribution in favor of the lower income classes 
suggests that either the salience of the redistributive component of state 
fiscal policies in regard to partisan politics in the American states is 
rather low or that som&-as yet untapped-characteristic of the political 
parties will reveal the proper associations. 
